The Dispute over S₁ in Autism and Its Clinical Consequences
A talk given in Poznań on 18 April 2026 at the seminar Differential Diagnosis of Autism and Schizophrenia with Katty Langelez-Stevens, organised by the Warsaw Circle and the Cracow Circle of Psychoanalysis of the NLS.
Éric Laurent’s text is the record of a talk he gave in Paris on 14 June 2025 at a CERA meeting, which I had the opportunity to attend. As my contribution to today’s work on this text, I will first present Laurent’s position in the dispute over S₁ in autism, and then the practical consequences that follow from his theorisation.
Freezing or foreclosure
Let us go back to 2021, when Jean-Claude Maleval published La Différence autistique, the result of careful work on the clinic of autism, from Bleuler through Kanner and Asperger to Lacan. Maleval lists the features that distinguish autism from psychosis, among them the absence of delusions, verbal hallucinations and a moment of triggering. The flashpoint of the discussion, however, would be the status of S₁, the master signifier in autism, which Maleval describes as “frozen”.
With the term “freezing” Maleval refers to Lacan’s formulation in the Geneva Lecture on the Symptom of 1975: the point is to know why, in the autistic person or in the one we call a schizophrenic, there is something “that freezes”. The freezing of S₁ locks the subject into a repetition that does not lend itself to dialectisation. According to Maleval this term is more fitting than foreclosure, because it leaves open the possibility of unfreezing. High-functioning autistic people bear witness to this possibility: they have acquired a capacity for enunciation and are able to enter into a living, unpredictable contact with the Other. This is why Maleval reserves foreclosure for psychosis alone and regards the freezing of S₁ as a phenomenon typical of autism.
Jacques-Alain Miller, for his part, asked to write a preface to Maleval’s book, ventures to state in that preface:
“The word freezing is indeed used once by Lacan in reference to autism. But is it prudent to apply freezing to the master signifier? As a signifier, it is mortified and mortifying, it does not belong to the order of the living, it is not subject to freezing and thawing. Does it not seem more advisable to take it as foreclosed? This, moreover, is exactly what the Leforts, cited by Maleval, do […]”.
Two S₁s
Éric Laurent refers to this discussion in the text we are discussing today. Laurent specifies that two kinds of S₁ must be firmly distinguished. The first is the primordial S₁, which creates 0 as the empty set and makes the enumeration of jouissance possible, starting from that empty set. The second is the S₁ that links up with S₂, as in the signifying chain or in the private languages created by autistic subjects.
Maleval seems to be speaking of S₁ in the second sense when he sees an unfreezing of S₁ in high-functioning autistic subjects. Laurent, by contrast, argues that foreclosure concerns rather the first kind of S₁: the primordial signifier separating 1 and 0, which structures jouissance symbolically and allows it to be counted. Foreclosure results in uncountability, and the consequence of uncountability is the dominance of a single, autistic jouissance without the Other. This would be the source of the need to create repetitive circuits in which the autistic subject can function safely.
Circuit and rim
Circuit is Laurent’s term for repetitive behaviours that serve to master autistic jouissance. The autistic subject constructs a repetitive behaviour, for instance rocking, tapping or spinning the wheels of toys, without creating any new meaning. Such a circuit is not a chain of signifiers but a succession of them: it does not serve to produce sense but to regulate jouissance.
The regulation of jouissance through the circuit in turn makes it possible to maintain the rim. The rim is a topological term for the symbolic-imaginary boundary separating the subject from the Other. The rim may be formed by autistic objects, the double or special interests. A breach of the rim causes anguish, which repetitive behaviours within the circuit can reduce.
Clinical consequences
What practical consequences can we draw from this theorisation?
Forcing an autistic subject to give up their objects is a serious mistake that may provoke extreme anxiety or aggression, because it disrupts the subject’s defensive foundations. That is why, in work with an autistic subject, one must first be included in their world as a safe and controlled object. Rather than forcibly taking objects away from an autistic patient, it is better to make use of them. Working on the circuit does not mean doing away with it entirely, but creating conditions that favour giving up part of the autistic jouissance without anguish.
By way of illustration, a clinical vignette. In his book La Bataille de l’autisme, Éric Laurent recounts the case of a boy who would not part with his stick, constantly waving it and hitting with it. Instead of forbidding the stick and treating it as a problem to be removed, the therapeutic team decided to include it in a more complex arrangement. First the carers managed to link the movement of the stick to the strokes of the bell clapper in a nearby church. Thanks to this the boy’s fascination shifted from the stick itself to the strokes of the bell, and then to the regular hours at which the bell rang. Next the boy’s attention turned to the hands of the clock, and the clock opened a direct path to a fascination with numbers, which the boy took in at first very concretely, hour by hour, and over time more and more abstractly, in larger units of time. The result of this series of displacements was the ability to engage in learning arithmetic and to take up schooling.
The analyst must therefore bracket their own desire and consent to being an object that does not impose its own intentions. This is not possible without one’s own analysis with an analyst who was able not to draw personal gain from their act.